FinCEN提议制定旨在提高可兑换虚拟货币混币行为的透明度并打击恐怖融资的新法规

FinCEN Proposes New Regulation to Enhance Transparency in Convertible Virtual Currency Mixing and Combat Terrorist Financing

FinCEN提议制定旨在提高可兑换虚拟货币混币行为的透明度并打击恐怖融资的新法规

https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-proposes-new-regulation-enhance-transparency-convertible-virtual-currencyOctober 19, 2023WASHINGTON – Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) announced a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) that identifies international Convertible Virtual Currency Mixing (CVC mixing) as a class of transactions of primary money laundering concern. This NPRM highlights the risks posed by the extensive use of CVC mixing services by a variety of illicit actors throughout the world and proposes a rule to increase transparency around CVC mixing to combat its use by malicious actors including Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The NPRM is a key part of Treasury’s efforts to promote transparency for CVC mixing activities.

当地时间2023年10月19日，华盛顿发布。今天，美国财政部金融犯罪执法网络（FinCEN）宣布了一则拟议规则制定通知（NPRM），将国际可兑换虚拟货币（CVC）混币行为确定为一种重大洗钱问题交易类别。本拟议规则制定通知强调了全世界各种不法分子广泛使用可兑换虚拟货币混币服务所带来的风险，并提出了一项旨在提高可兑换虚拟货币混币行为透明度的规则，以打击包括哈马斯、杰哈德和朝鲜在内的恶意行为者对可兑换虚拟货币的使用。本拟议规则制定通知是财政部提高可兑换虚拟货币混币活动透明度行动的关键部分。“Today’s action underscores Treasury’s commitment to combatting the exploitation of Convertible Virtual Currency mixing by a broad range of illicit actors, including state-affiliated cyber actors, cyber criminals, and terrorist groups,” said Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Wally Adeyemo. “More broadly, the Treasury Department is aggressively combatting illicit use of all aspects of the CVC ecosystem by terrorist groups, including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.”

财政部副部长阿德耶莫（Wally Adeyemo）表示，“今天的行动强调了财政部致力于打击各种不法分子对可兑换虚拟货币混币行为的利用，包括官方网络行为体、网络犯罪分子和恐怖组织。更广泛地说，财政部正在积极打击包括哈马斯和杰哈德在内的恐怖组织对可兑换虚拟货币生态系统各个方面的非法使用。”“CVC mixing offers a critical service that allows players in the ransomware ecosystem, rogue state actors, and other criminals to fund their unlawful activities and obfuscate the flow of ill-gotten gains,” said FinCEN Director Andrea Gacki. “This is FinCEN’s first ever use of the Section 311 authority to target a class of transactions of primary money laundering concern, and, just as with our efforts in the traditional financial system, Treasury will work to identify and root out the illicit use and abuse of the CVC ecosystem.”

FinCEN主任加基（Andrea Gacki）表示，“可兑换虚拟货币混币行为提供了一项关键服务，使勒索软件生态系统中的参与者、流氓国家行为者和其他犯罪分子得以为其非法活动提供资金，并混淆非法所得的流向。这是FinCEN有史以来首次利用《美国爱国者法案》第311节（注：针对存在重大洗钱问题的司法管辖区、金融机构或国际交易的特别措施）的授权来瞄准一种重大洗钱问题交易类别，并且正如我们在传统金融体系中所做的努力一样，财政部将致力于识别并根除可兑换虚拟货币生态系统的非法使用和滥用。”The lack of transparency surrounding international CVC mixing activity is an acute money laundering and national security risk, and increasing transparency in connection with this activity is a key component to denying illicit actors access to the U.S. and global financial systems. This increased transparency is also consistent with longstanding Treasury Department efforts to counter the efforts of terrorist groups, such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, that engage in violence against innocent civilians; the efforts of ransomware criminals targeting critical infrastructure; and the efforts by state actors and their supporters to evade U.S. and global sanctions. In support of these important goals, the NPRM would require covered financial institutions to report information about a transaction when they know, suspect, or have reason to suspect it involves CVC mixing within or involving jurisdictions outside the United States.

国际可兑换虚拟货币混币活动缺乏透明度是一种严重的洗钱和国家安全风险，提高与该活动有关的透明度是阻止不法分子进入美国和全球金融体系的关键组成部分。提高透明度也符合财政部长期以来的努力，即打击哈马斯和杰哈德等对无辜平民实施暴力的恐怖组织；瞄准关键基础设施的勒索软件犯罪分子；以及逃避美国和全球制裁的国家行为者及其支持者。为了支持这些重要目标，本拟议规则制定通知将要求受监管金融机构在知道、怀疑或有理由怀疑交易与美国境内或者涉及美国境外司法管辖区的可兑换虚拟货币混币行为有关时报告交易信息。The proposed rule announced today follows multiple prior actions by Treasury to target illicit finance involving the use of mixing services. In February 2022, the 2022 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment (NMLRA) identified that criminals have increased their use of anonymity-enhancing technologies, including CVC mixing, to help hide the movement or origin of funds. Shortly after publication of the NMLRA, OFAC designated Blender.io, which provided mixing services that were used by DPRK to launder over $20.5 million from the Axie Infinity Heist in May 2022. In 2022, OFAC also designated Tornado Cash, which provided mixing services that obfuscated the movement of over $455 million stolen in March 2022 by the OFAC-designated, North Korea-controlled Lazarus Group in the largest known virtual currency heist to date. In addition to actions specifically focused on mitigating risks associated with CVC mixing, Treasury has taken several other actions to counter illicit finance in the CVC ecosystem more broadly. For example, in January 2023, FinCEN identified the virtual currency exchange Bitzlato Limited as a primary money laundering concern in connection with Russian illicit finance, an action coordinated with U.S. law enforcement and foreign partners.

在今天宣布拟议规则之前，财政部曾多次针对涉及使用混币服务的非法金融活动采取行动。2022年2月，《2022年国家洗钱风险评估》（NMLRA）发现，犯罪分子越来越多地使用匿名增强技术，包括可兑换虚拟货币混币行为在内，以帮助隐藏资金的动向或来源。《国家洗钱风险评估》发布后不久，海外资产控制办公室（OFAC）列名了Blender.io，罪名是其提供的混币服务被朝鲜用于在2022年5月Axie Infinity抢劫案中清洗超过2050万美元非法所得。2022年，OFAC还列名了Tornado Cash，罪名是其提供的混币服务混淆了2022年3月OFAC列名的、受朝鲜控制的拉撒路集团盗取的超过4.55亿美元非法所得的动向，这是迄今为止已知最大的虚拟货币抢劫案。除了专门聚焦于减轻可兑换虚拟货币混币行为相关风险的行动外，财政部还采取了其他几项行动，以更广泛地打击可兑换虚拟货币生态系统中的非法金融活动。例如，2023年1月，FinCEN认定虚拟货币交易所Bitzlato Limited存在与俄罗斯非法金融活动有关的重大洗钱问题，该行动是与美国执法部门和外国伙伴协调开展的。The NPRM as submitted to the Federal Register is currently available here. A machine-readable version of the NPRM as transmitted to the Federal Register will also soon be available on FinCEN’s website. Written comments to the NPRM may be submitted within 90 days of publication of the NPRM in the Federal Register.

提交给《联邦公报》的本拟议规则制定通知目前可在此处获得。发送至《联邦公报》的本拟议规则制定通知的机器可读版本也将很快在FinCEN网站上提供。请于本拟议规则制定通知在《联邦公报》发布后的90天内提交书面意见。—————————————————————-Proposal of Special Measure Regarding Convertible Virtual Currency Mixing, as a Class of Transactions of Primary Money Laundering Concern

FinCEN发布《关于可兑换虚拟货币混币行为作为一种重大洗钱问题交易类别的特别措施的提议》（节选）

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/10/23/2023-23449/proposal-of-special-measure-regarding-convertible-virtual-currency-mixing-as-a-class-of-transactionsDEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURYFinancial Crimes Enforcement Network

财政部金融犯罪执法网络31 CFR Part 1010RIN 1506-AB64《美国联邦法规》（CFR）第31编（注：货币和金融：财政部）第10章（注：财政部FinCEN）第1010部分（注：总则）

法规识别号（RIN）1506-AB64Proposal of Special Measure Regarding Convertible Virtual Currency Mixing, as a Class of Transactions of Primary Money Laundering Concern

关于可兑换虚拟货币混币行为作为一种重大洗钱问题交易类别的特别措施的提议AGENCY: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), Treasury.

机构：财政部FinCENACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

行动：拟议规则制定通知SUMMARY: FinCEN is issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), pursuant to section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, that proposes requiring domestic financial institutions and domestic financial agencies to implement certain recordkeeping and reporting requirements relating to transactions involving convertible virtual currency (CVC) mixing.

摘要：FinCEN依照《美国爱国者法案》第311节发布本拟议规则制定通知，提议要求国内金融机构和国内金融中介对涉及可兑换虚拟货币混币行为的交易实施某些记录保存和报告要求。DATES: Written comments on the notice of proposed rulemaking must be submitted on or before January 22, 2024.

日期：本拟议规则制定通知的书面意见反馈截止时间为2024年1月22日。ADDRESSES: Comments must be submitted by one of the following methods:地址：公众必须通过以下方式之一提交意见：

• Federal E-rulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments. Refer to Docket Number FINCEN-2023-0016 in the submission.
• 联邦电子规则制定门户网站：https://www.regulations.gov。请遵照说明提交意见。提交时请引用案卷号FINCEN-2023-0016。
• Mail: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, P.O. Box 39, Vienna, VA 22183. Refer to Docket Number FINCEN-2023-0016 in the submission.
• 邮寄至：FinCEN，弗吉尼亚州，费尔法克斯县，维也纳镇，邮政信箱39，邮编22183。提交时请引用案卷号FINCEN-2023-0016。

Please submit comments by one method only, and note that comments submitted in responses to this NPRM will become a matter of public record.

请只以一种方式提交意见，并注意，针对本拟议规则制定通知提交的意见将成为公开记录。FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The FinCEN Regulatory Support Section at 1-800-767-2825 or electronically at frc@fincen.gov.

了解更多信息，请联系：FinCEN监管支持科，电话1-800-767-2825或电子邮箱frc@fincen.gov。SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

补充信息：I. Statutory Provisions

一、法律规定Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act (section 311), codified at 31 U.S.C. 5318A, grants the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) authority, upon finding that reasonable grounds exist for concluding that one or more classes of transactions within or involving a jurisdiction outside of the United States is of primary money laundering concern, to require domestic financial institutions and domestic financial agencies to take certain “special measures.” The authority of the Secretary to administer section 311 and the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) has been delegated to FinCEN.

根据《美国法典》（USC）第31编（注：货币和金融）第53章（注：货币交易）第5318A节（注：针对存在重大洗钱问题的司法管辖区、金融机构、国际交易或账户类型的特别措施）编纂的《美国爱国者法案》第311节，赋予财政部长权力，在发现有合理理由认为美国境内或者涉及美国境外司法管辖区的一类或几类交易存在重大洗钱问题，要求国内金融机构和国内金融中介采取某些“特别措施”。财政部长执行第311节和《银行保密法》（BSA）的权力已委任给FinCEN。The five special measures set out in section 311 are prophylactic safeguards that may be employed to defend the United States financial system from money laundering and terrorist financing risks. The Secretary may impose one or more of these special measures in order to protect the U.S. financial system from such threats. Through special measure one, the Secretary may require domestic financial institutions and domestic financial agencies to maintain records, file reports, or both, concerning the aggregate amount of transactions or individual transactions. Through special measures two through four, the Secretary may impose additional recordkeeping, information collection, and reporting requirements on covered domestic financial institutions and domestic financial agencies. Through special measure five, the Secretary may prohibit, or impose conditions upon, the opening or maintaining in the United States of correspondent or payable-through accounts for or on behalf of a foreign banking institution, if the class of transactions found to be of primary money laundering concern may be conducted through such correspondent account or payable-through account.

第311节规定的五项特别措施是预防性保障措施，可用于保护美国金融体系免受洗钱和恐怖融资风险的侵害。为了保护美国金融体系免受此类威胁，财政部长可以实施一项或多项特别措施。通过特别措施1，财政部长可以要求国内金融机构和国内金融中介就交易总额或单笔交易保存记录、提交报告或两者兼而有之。通过特别措施2至4，财政部长可以对受监管国内金融机构和国内金融中介提出额外的记录保存、信息收集和报告要求。通过特别措施5，当被认定为存在重大洗钱问题的交易类别可能会通过代理账户或者通汇账户（PTA）进行时，财政部长可以禁止为外国银行机构或者代表外国银行机构在美国开立或维持代理账户或者通汇账户，或对此施加条件。Before making a finding that reasonable grounds exist for concluding that a class of transactions is of primary money laundering concern, the Secretary is required to consult with both the Secretary of State and the Attorney General. The Secretary is also required to consider such information as the Secretary determines to be relevant, including the following potentially relevant factors:在得出有合理理由认定某类交易存在重大洗钱问题的结论之前，财政部长必须与国务卿和总检察长磋商。财政部长还必须考虑其认为相关的信息，包括以下潜在相关因素在内：

• The extent to which such class of transactions is used to facilitate or promote money laundering in or through a jurisdiction outside the United States, including any money laundering activity by organized criminal groups, international terrorists, or entities involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or missiles;
• 此类交易被用于在美国境内或者通过美国境外的司法管辖区便利或促进洗钱的程度，包括有组织犯罪集团、国际恐怖分子、或者参与大规模杀伤性武器（WMD）或导弹扩散的实体的任何洗钱活动；
• The extent to which such class of transactions is used for legitimate business purposes in the jurisdiction; and
• 此类交易被用于司法管辖区内合法商业目的的程度；
• The extent to which such action is sufficient to ensure that the purposes of section 311 are fulfilled and to guard against international money laundering and other financial crimes.
• 此类行动足以确保实现第311节的目的并防范国际洗钱和其他金融犯罪的程度。

Upon finding that a class of transactions is of primary money laundering concern, the Secretary may require covered financial institutions to take one or more special measures. In selecting one or more special measures, the Secretary “shall consult with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, any other appropriate Federal banking agency (as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act), the Secretary of State, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the National Credit Union Administration Board, and in the sole discretion of the Secretary, such other agencies and interested parties as the Secretary may find appropriate.”

一旦发现某类交易存在重大洗钱问题，财政部长可以要求受监管金融机构采取一项或多项特别措施。在选择一项或多项特别措施时，财政部长“应当与美联储主席、其他任何适当的联邦银行监管机构（定义见《联邦存款保险法案》第3节）、国务卿、证券交易委员会（SEC）、商品期货交易委员会（CFTC）、国家信用社管理局（NCUA）董事会、以及财政部长认为适当的其他机构和利益相关方磋商。”In addition, the Secretary is required to consider the following factors when selecting special measures:此外，财政部长在选择特别措施时还必须考虑以下因素：

• Whether similar action has been or is being taken by other nations or multilateral groups;
• 其他国家或多边组织是否已经或者正在采取类似行动；
• Whether the imposition of any particular special measure would create a significant competitive disadvantage, including any undue cost or burden associated with compliance, for financial institutions organized or licensed in the United States;
• 实施任何特定的特别措施是否会对在美国成立或持牌的金融机构造成重大的竞争劣势，包括与合规相关的任何不当成本或负担在内；
• The extent to which the action or the timing of the action would have a significant adverse systemic impact on the international payment, clearance, and settlement system, or on legitimate business activities involving the particular jurisdiction, institution, class of transactions, or type of account; and
• 该行动或行动的时机将对国际支付、清算和结算系统、或者涉及特定司法管辖区、机构、交易类别或账户类型的合法商业活动产生重大系统性不利影响的程度；
• The effect of the action on United States national security and foreign policy.
• 该行动对美国国家安全和外交政策的影响。

II. Summary of NPRM

二、拟议规则制定通知摘要Convertible Virtual Currency (CVC) mixing entails the facilitation of CVC transactions in a manner that obfuscates the source, destination, or amount involved in one or more transactions. Because CVC mixing is intended to make CVC transactions untraceable and anonymous, CVC mixing is ripe for abuse by, and frequently used by, illicit foreign actors that threaten the national security of the United States and the U.S. financial system. By obscuring the connection between the CVC wallet addresses used to receive illicit CVC proceeds and the CVC wallet addresses from which illicit CVC is transferred to CVC-to-fiat currency exchangers, other CVC users, or CVC exchanges, CVC mixing transactions can play a central role in facilitating the laundering of CVC derived from a variety of illicit activity.

可兑换虚拟货币混币行为需要以混淆一笔或多笔交易的来源、去向或者金额的方式来为可兑换虚拟货币交易提供便利。由于可兑换虚拟货币混币行为的目的是使可兑换虚拟货币交易变得匿名和无法追溯，因此可兑换虚拟货币混币行为很容易被外国不法分子滥用，并且经常被其使用，从而威胁到美国的国家安全和美国金融体系。通过掩盖用于接收非法可兑换虚拟货币收益的可兑换虚拟货币钱包地址与将非法可兑换虚拟货币划转至可兑换虚拟货币与法定货币兑换商、其他可兑换虚拟货币用户或者可兑换虚拟货币交易所的可兑换虚拟货币钱包地址之间的联系，可兑换虚拟货币混币交易可以在为清洗源自各种非法活动的可兑换虚拟货币提供便利方面发挥核心作用。Indeed, CVC mixing transactions are frequently used by criminals and state actors to facilitate a range of illicit activity, including, but not limited to, money laundering, sanctions evasion and WMD proliferation by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), Russian-associated ransomware attacks, and illicit darknet markets. Further, a recent assessment by FinCEN determined that the percentage of CVC transactions processed by CVC mixers that originated from likely illicit sources is increasing. CVC mixing often involves foreign jurisdictions because persons who facilitate or engage in CVC mixing transactions are often located abroad, including notable recent CVC mixing activity involving DPRK-affiliated threat actors, Russian ransomware actors, and buyers and sellers on Russian darknet markets.

事实上，可兑换虚拟货币混币交易经常被犯罪分子和国家行为者用来为一系列非法活动提供便利，包括但不限于朝鲜的洗钱、逃避制裁和大规模杀伤性武器扩散、与俄罗斯相关的勒索软件攻击、以及非法暗网市场。此外，FinCEN最近的一项评估确定，由可能来自非法来源的可兑换虚拟货币混币器处理的可兑换虚拟货币交易的比例正在增加。可兑换虚拟货币混币行为往往涉及外国司法管辖区，原因是便利或参与可兑换虚拟货币混币交易的人往往位于国外，包括最近引人注目的涉及朝鲜附属的威胁行为者、俄罗斯勒索软件行为者、以及俄罗斯暗网市场上的买卖双方的可兑换虚拟货币混币活动。Accordingly, because CVC mixing provides foreign illicit actors with enhanced anonymity that allows them to launder their illicit proceeds, FinCEN assesses that transactions involving CVC mixing within or involving a jurisdiction outside the United States are of primary money laundering concern, and, having undertaken the necessary consultations, also finds that imposing additional recordkeeping and reporting requirements would assist in mitigating the risks posed by such transactions. Such reporting will assist law enforcement with identifying the perpetrators behind illicit transactions and preventing, investigating, and prosecuting illegal activity, as well as rendering such transactions – through increased transparency – less attractive and useful to illicit actors. This NPRM (1) sets forth FinCEN’s finding that transactions involving CVC mixing within or involving jurisdictions outside the United States are a class of transactions that are of primary money laundering concern; and (2) proposes, under special measure one, requiring covered financial institutions to implement certain recordkeeping and reporting requirements on transactions that covered financial institutions know, suspect, or have reason to suspect involve CVC mixing within or involving jurisdictions outside the United States.

相应地，由于可兑换虚拟货币混币行为为外国不法分子提供了增强的匿名性，使其能够清洗非法收益，FinCEN评估认为，与美国境内或者涉及美国境外司法管辖区的可兑换虚拟货币混币行为有关的交易存在重大洗钱问题，并且在进行了必要的磋商后，还发现实施额外的记录保存和报告要求将有助于减轻此类交易带来的风险。这样的报告将有助于执法部门查明非法交易背后的实施者，预防、调查和起诉非法活动，并通过提高透明度来降低此类交易对不法分子的吸引力和用处。本拟议规则制定通知⑴阐述了FinCEN的评估结果，即与美国境内或者涉及美国境外司法管辖区的可兑换虚拟货币混币行为有关的交易是一种重大洗钱问题交易类别；并⑵在特别措施1项下，提议要求受监管金融机构对知道、怀疑或有理由怀疑与美国境内或者涉及美国境外司法管辖区的可兑换虚拟货币混币行为有关的交易实施某些记录保存和报告要求。III. Background

三、背景Although the United States supports innovation and advances in digital and distributed ledger technology for financial services, it must also consider the substantial implications that such technology has for national security and mitigate the attendant risks for consumers, businesses, national security, and the integrity of the broader U.S. financial system. CVC can be used for legitimate and innovative purposes. However, it is not without its risks and, in particular, the use of CVC to anonymize illicit activity undermines the legitimate and innovative uses of CVC.

尽管美国支持金融服务数字化和分布式账本技术的创新和进步，但它也必须考虑到这种技术对国家安全的实质性影响，并减轻随之而来的对消费者、企业、国家安全和更广泛的美国金融体系完整性的风险（注：见https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/09/fact-sheet-president-biden-to-sign-executive-order-on-ensuring-responsible-innovation-in-digital-assets/）。可兑换虚拟货币可用于合法和创新目的。然而，它并非没有风险，特别是将可兑换虚拟货币用于非法活动的匿名化会破坏可兑换虚拟货币的合法和创新用途。A. CVC mixing and its mechanisms

（一）可兑换虚拟货币混币行为及其机制The term “virtual currency” refers to a medium of exchange that can operate like currency but does not have all the attributes of “real,” or fiat, currency. CVC is a type of virtual currency that either has an equivalent value as currency or acts as a substitute for currency and is therefore a type of “value that substitutes for currency.” The label applies to any particular type of CVC, such as “digital currency,” “cryptocurrency,” “cryptoasset,” and “digital asset.”

“虚拟货币”一词指的是一种交换媒介，它可以像货币一样运作，但不具备“真实”或法定货币的所有属性。可兑换虚拟货币是一种虚拟货币，它与货币具有同等价值或者充当货币的替代品，因此是一种“替代货币的价值”。该标签适用于任何特定类型的可兑换虚拟货币，如“数字货币”、“加密货币”、“加密资产”和“数字资产”（注：见https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/new-fincen-guidance-affirms-its-longstanding-regulatory-framework-virtual）。The public nature of most CVC blockchains, which provide a permanent, recorded history of all previous transactions, make it possible to know someone’s entire financial history on the blockchain. Anonymity enhancing tools, including “mixers,” are used to avoid this. To provide enhanced anonymity, CVC mixers provide a service – CVC mixing – that is intended to obfuscate transactional information, allowing users to obscure their connection to the CVC.

大多数可兑换虚拟货币区块链的公共性质提供了以前所有交易的永久记录历史，使人们有可能了解某人在区块链上的整个财务历史。匿名增强工具，包括“混币器”在内，被用来避免这种情况。为了提供增强的匿名性，可兑换虚拟货币混币器提供了一种服务，即可兑换虚拟货币混币行为，其目的是混淆交易信息，使用户能够掩盖自己与可兑换虚拟货币的联系。There are a number of ways to conduct CVC mixing transactions – one of the most common of which is the use of CVC mixers. CVC mixers can accomplish this through a variety of mechanisms, including: pooling or aggregating CVC from multiple individuals, wallets, or accounts into a single transaction or transactions; splitting an amount into multiple amounts and transmitting the CVC as a series of smaller independent transactions; or leveraging code to coordinate, manage, or manipulate the structure of the transaction; among other methods. Through such mechanisms, CVC mixers can functionally simulate a customer depositing funds from an anonymous account into a financial institution’s omnibus account and withdrawing funds into a separate anonymous account. For example, a criminal actor could take the illicit proceeds of their crime, send the CVC to a CVC mixer, and then on to an account they hold at a virtual asset service provider (VASP). At this point, the VASP would take custody of the illicitly sourced CVC, thereby allowing illicit funds to enter their omnibus account, all while being unaware of the origin of the illicit CVC. The critical challenge is that CVC mixing services rarely, if ever, provide to regulators or law enforcement the resulting transactional chain or information collected as part of the transaction.

有许多方法可以进行可兑换虚拟货币混币交易——其中最常见的一种是使用可兑换虚拟货币混币器。可兑换虚拟货币混币器可以通过各种机制来实现这一点，包括：将来自多个个人、钱包或账户的可兑换虚拟货币汇集或聚合成一笔或多笔交易；将一笔金额拆分为多笔金额，并将可兑换虚拟货币作为一系列较小的独立交易进行传输；或者利用代码来协调、管理或操纵交易的结构；以及其他方法。通过这样的机制，可兑换虚拟货币混币器可以在功能上模拟客户将资金从匿名账户存入金融机构的综合账户，并将资金提取到另一个匿名账户（注：见https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1391）。例如，犯罪分子可以从犯罪中获得非法收益，将可兑换虚拟货币发送给混币器，接着划转至自己在虚拟资产服务提供商（VASP）处开立的账户。届时，非法获取的可兑换虚拟货币将由虚拟资产服务提供商保管，从而使非法资金能够进入犯罪分子的综合账户，同时不知道非法可兑换虚拟货币的来源。关键的挑战是，可兑换虚拟货币混币服务很少（如果有的话）向监管机构或执法部门提供由此产生的交易链或者作为交易一部分收集的信息。CVC mixing does not, however, wholly rely on the use of CVC mixers. There are certain methods that CVC users – and CVC mixers – often employ in an effort to obfuscate their transactions. These methods include:

然而，可兑换虚拟货币混币行为并不完全依赖于对可兑换虚拟货币混币器的使用。可兑换虚拟货币用户和可兑换虚拟货币混币器往往使用以下特定方法来混淆他们的交易：a. Pooling or aggregating CVC from multiple persons, wallets, addresses, or accounts: This method involves combining CVC from two or more persons into a single wallet or smart contract and, by pooling or aggregating that CVC, obfuscating the identity of both parties to the transaction by decreasing the probability of determining both intended persons for each unique transaction.

1．汇集或聚合来自多个个人、钱包、地址或账户的可兑换虚拟货币：该方法涉及将来自两个及以上个人的可兑换虚拟货币合并到单个钱包或智能合约中，并通过汇集或聚合该可兑换虚拟货币，来混淆交易双方的身份，从而降低确定每笔唯一交易的预期对手方的概率。b. Splitting CVC for transmittal and transmitting the CVC through a series of independent transactions: This method involves splitting a single transaction from sender to receiver into multiple, smaller transactions, in a manner similar to structuring, to make transactions blend in with other, unrelated transactions on the blockchain occurring at the same time so as to not stand out, thereby decreasing the probability of determining both intended persons for each unique transaction.

2．拆分可兑换虚拟货币用于传输，并通过一系列独立交易来传输可兑换虚拟货币：该方法涉及将从发送方到接收方的单笔交易以类似于构造性交易的方式拆分为多笔较小的交易，使交易与区块链上同时发生的其他无关交易混合在一起，以免引起注意，从而降低确定每笔唯一交易的预期对手方的概率。c. Using programmatic or algorithmic code to coordinate, manage, or manipulate the structure of a transaction: This method involves the use of software that coordinates two or more persons’ transactions together in order to obfuscate the individual unique transactions by providing multiple potential outputs from a coordinated input, decreasing the probability of determining both intended persons for each unique transaction.

3．使用编程或算法代码来协调、管理或操纵交易的结构：该方法涉及使用软件来协调两个及以上个人的交易，以便通过提供一个协调输入的多个潜在输出来混淆单笔唯一交易，从而降低确定每笔唯一交易的预期对手方的概率。d. Creating and using single-use wallets, addresses, or accounts and sending CVC through these wallets, addresses, or accounts in a series of transactions: This method involves the use of single-use wallets, addresses, or accounts – colloquially known as a “peel chain” – in a series of unnatural transactions that have the purpose or effect of obfuscating the source and destination of funds by volumetrically increasing the number of involved transactions, thereby decreasing the probability of determining both intended persons for each unique transaction.

4．创建和使用一次性钱包、地址或账户，并在一系列交易中通过这些钱包、地址和账户发送可兑换虚拟货币：该方法涉及使用一次性钱包，地址或账户——俗称“剥离链”——进行一系列非自然交易，其目的或效果是通过大量增加所涉交易数量来混淆资金的来源和去向，从而降低确定每笔唯一交易的预期对手方的概率。e. Exchanging between types of CVC, or other digital assets: This method involves exchanges between two or more types of CVC or other digital assets – colloquially referred to as “chain hopping” – to facilitate transaction obfuscation by converting one CVC into a different CVC at least once before moving the funds to another service or platform thereby decreasing the probability of determining both intended persons for each unique transaction.

5．不同类型的可兑换虚拟货币或其他数字资产之间的转换：该方法涉及两种及以上类型的可兑换虚拟货币或其他数字资产之间进行转换——俗称“跳链”——在将资金划转至另一个服务或平台之前，通过将一种可兑换虚拟货币转换成另一种可兑换虚拟货币至少一次，来为交易的混淆提供便利，从而降低确定每笔唯一交易的预期对手方的概率（注：见https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-issues-report-ransomware-trends-bank-secrecy-act-data）。f. Facilitating user-initiated delays in transactional activity: This method involves the use of software, programs, or other technology that programmatically carry out pre-determined timed-delay of transactions by delaying the output of a transaction in order to make that transaction appear to be unrelated to transactional input, thereby decreasing the probability of determining both intended persons for each unique transaction.

6．为用户发起的交易活动延迟提供便利：该方法涉及使用软件、程序或其他技术，通过延迟交易的输出来以编程方式对交易执行预先确定的定时延迟，以便使该笔交易看起来与输入的交易无关，从而降低确定每笔唯一交易的预期对手方的概率。B. Use of CVC mixing by illicit foreign actors

（二）外国不法分子对可兑换虚拟货币混币行为的使用Illicit actors use enhanced anonymity on the blockchain to avoid detection by authorities as they launder their illicit proceeds. By obfuscating identity and preventing the attribution of ownership of CVC, CVC mixing allows illicit actors, such as cyber threat actors carrying out ransomware attacks or cyber heists, to launder their CVC and convert it into fiat currency, minimizing the risk of being detected by involved financial institutions, including VASPs, or relevant authorities. Because wallet addresses are pseudonymous and CVC mixing severs the connection between the identity of users sending and receiving CVC, illicit actors are able to exploit vulnerabilities in anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regulatory frameworks, threatening the effectiveness of rules which require financial institutions to, among other things, know the identity of their customers and report suspicious activity to FinCEN.

不法分子利用区块链上增强的匿名性来避免自己在清洗非法收益时被主管部门发现。通过混淆身份并防止可兑换虚拟货币所有权的归属，可兑换虚拟货币混币行为使实施勒索软件攻击或者网络抢劫的网络威胁行为者等不法分子能够清洗可兑换虚拟货币并将其兑换成法定货币，从而最大限度地降低被包括虚拟资产服务提供商在内的所涉金融机构或相关主管部门发现的风险。由于钱包地址是假名，而可兑换虚拟货币混币行为切断了发送和接收可兑换虚拟货币的用户身份之间的联系，因此不法分子能够利用反洗钱和反恐怖融资监管框架中的漏洞（注：见https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1391），从而威胁到要求金融机构了解客户的身份并向FinCEN报告可疑活动的规则的有效性。Over the past few years, Treasury has monitored, and expressed concern with, the increasing use of CVC mixing by illicit actors, including North Korea-affiliated cyber threat actors, ransomware actors, and darknet market participants, to transfer and launder their illicit proceeds. In particular, the DPRK – already under pressure from robust United States, European Union, United Kingdom, and United Nations sanctions – relies upon CVC mixing to launder the proceeds of cyber heists in order to finance the DPRK’s WMD program. The Axie Infinity Ronin Bridge (Axie Infinity) heist – committed in March 2022, worth almost $620 million and carried out by the DPRK-controlled Lazarus Group – remains, for instance, the largest cyber heist to date, and made high profile use of at least two mixers to launder the proceeds of the theft – Blender.io and Tornado Cash.

在过去几年中，财政部一直在监测可兑换虚拟货币混币行为越来越多地被包括朝鲜附属的网络威胁行为者、勒索软件行为者和暗网市场参与者在内的不法分子用来转移和清洗非法收益，并对此表示关切。特别是，已经受到美国、欧盟、英国和联合国强有力制裁压力的朝鲜，依靠可兑换虚拟货币混币行为来清洗网络抢劫的收益，以便为其大规模杀伤性武器计划提供资金。例如，2022年3月发生的、由受朝鲜控制的拉撒路集团实施的、价值近6.2亿美元的Axie Infinity 浪人桥抢劫案，仍是迄今为止最大的网络抢劫案（注：见https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0768），并且高调使用了至少两种混币器——Blender.io和Tornado Cash——来清洗盗窃收益（注：见https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1087）。CVC mixing is also commonly used to obfuscate the source of CVC obtained through other illicit activities, such as ransomware attacks and the use and operation of darknet markets. For example, between January 2021 and June 2021, the top 10 most common ransomware variants reported in suspicious activity report (SAR) data, including several Russian-affiliated variants, sent approximately $35.2 million to CVC mixers and $252 million to darknet markets. Indeed, darknet marketplaces actively promote CVC mixers as the primary method for obfuscating related transactions, and, indeed, multiple CVC mixers historically interacted with Hydra, the former Russian darknet market that accounted for approximately 80 percent of all darknet market CVC transactions in 2021 before being shut down by United States and German law enforcement. Because darknet marketplaces are fundamentally illicit in nature, FinCEN assesses that illicit actors using darknet markets to purchase or sell illicit goods favor the ability to reduce the odds of being identified and leverage CVC mixing to enhance anonymity to that end. Similarly, ransomware actors also prefer an opportunity to successfully launder their illicit funds by using CVC mixing to enhance anonymity. The multiple U.S. Government actions against CVC mixers, often in coordination with international partners, demonstrate that CVC mixing provides illicit actors with enhanced anonymity in CVC transactions, allowing them to more easily launder their illicit proceeds in CVC.

可兑换虚拟货币混币行为通常还用于混淆通过勒索软件攻击以及暗网市场的使用和操作等其他非法活动获得的可兑换虚拟货币的来源。例如，2021年1-6月期间，可疑活动报告（SAR）数据中报送的前十大最常见勒索软件变种，包括几个俄罗斯附属的变种在内，向可兑换虚拟货币混币器发送了约3520万美元，向暗网市场发送了2.52亿美元（注：见https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-issues-report-ransomware-trends-bank-secrecy-act-data）。事实上，暗网市场积极推广可兑换虚拟货币混币器作为混淆相关交易的主要方法，并且事实上，多个可兑换虚拟货币混币器历史上曾与Hydra互动，这一前俄罗斯暗网市场在被美国和德国执法部门关闭之前，约占2021年所有暗网市场可兑换虚拟货币交易的80%。由于暗网市场本质上是非法的，FinCEN评估认为，利用暗网市场购买或销售非法商品的不法分子偏爱其能够降低被识别几率的能力，并利用可兑换虚拟货币混币行为来增强匿名性。类似地，勒索软件参与者也希望有机会通过使用可兑换虚拟货币混币行为来增强匿名性，从而成功清洗非法资金。美国政府经常与国际伙伴协调，对可兑换虚拟货币混币器采取的多项行动表明，可兑换虚拟货币混币行为为不法分子在可兑换虚拟货币交易中提供了增强的匿名性，这使他们能够更容易地在可兑换虚拟货币中清洗非法收益（注：见https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/first-bitcoin-mixer-penalized-fincen-violating-anti-money-laundering-laws）。IV. Finding that transactions that involve CVC mixing within or involving a jurisdiction outside the United States are a class of transactions of primary money laundering concern

四、认定与美国境内或者涉及美国境外司法管辖区的可兑换虚拟货币混币行为有关的交易为一种重大洗钱问题交易类别Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 5318A(a)(1), FinCEN finds that reasonable grounds exist for concluding that transactions involving CVC mixing within or involving a jurisdiction outside the United States are a class of transactions that is of primary money laundering concern. In making this finding, FinCEN considered the following statutory factors: (1) the extent to which the class of transactions is used to facilitate or promote money laundering in or through a jurisdiction outside of the United States, including money laundering activity with connections to international terrorism, organized crime, and proliferation of WMDs and missiles; (2) the extent to which a class of transactions is used for legitimate business purposes; and (3) the extent to which action by FinCEN would guard against international money laundering and other financial crimes.

根据《美国法典》第31编第5318A节第（a）条第（1）款的规定，FinCEN认为有合理理由得出与美国境内或者涉及美国境外司法管辖区的可兑换虚拟货币混币行为有关的交易是一种重大洗钱问题交易类别的结论。在得出这一结论时，FinCEN考虑了以下法定因素：⑴此类交易被用于在美国境内或者通过美国境外的司法管辖区便利或促进洗钱的程度，包括与国际恐怖主义、有组织犯罪、以及大规模杀伤性武器和导弹扩散有关的洗钱活动；⑵某类交易被用于合法商业目的的程度；以及⑶FinCEN的行动可以防范国际洗钱和其他金融犯罪的程度。A. The extent to which the class of transactions is used to facilitate or promote money laundering in or through a jurisdiction outside the United States, including any money laundering activity by organized criminal groups, international terrorists, or entities involved in the proliferation of WMD and missiles

（一）此类交易被用于在美国境内或者通过美国境外的司法管辖区便利或促进洗钱的程度，包括有组织犯罪集团、国际恐怖分子、或者参与大规模杀伤性武器或导弹扩散的实体的任何洗钱活动FinCEN assesses that foreign CVC mixing transactions are used to facilitate or promote money laundering in or through jurisdictions outside the United States, including by organized criminal groups, international terrorists, or entities involved in the proliferation of WMD and missiles. FinCEN based this assessment on information available to the agency, including both public and non-public reporting, and after thorough consideration of each of the following factors: (1) that transactions involving CVC mixing often occur within, or involve, jurisdictions outside of the United States; (2) that CVC mixing is used to launder proceeds of large-scale CVC theft and heists, and support the proliferation of WMD, in particular, by the DPRK; and (3) that CVC mixing is similarly used by ransomware actors and darknet markets to launder illicit proceeds.

FinCEN评估认为，外国可兑换虚拟货币混币交易被用于在美国境内或者通过美国境外的司法管辖区便利或促进洗钱，包括被有组织犯罪集团、国际恐怖分子、或者参与大规模杀伤性武器和导弹扩散的实体所利用。FinCEN的评估是基于可用的信息，包括公开和非公开报告，并充分考虑了以下因素：⑴涉及可兑换虚拟货币混币行为的交易往往发生在美国境内或者涉及美国境外的司法管辖区；⑵涉及可兑换虚拟货币混币行为的交易被用来清洗大规模可兑换虚拟货币盗窃和抢劫的收益，以及支持大规模杀伤性武器扩散，特别是在朝鲜；以及⑶可兑换虚拟货币混币行为同样被勒索软件行为者和暗网市场用来清洗非法收益。1. CVC Mixing Transactions Often Occur Within or Involve Jurisdictions Outside the United States

1．可兑换虚拟货币混币行为往往发生在美国境内或者涉及美国境外的司法管辖区CVC mixers conduct business with opaque operational structures and take steps to avoid the discovery of where they and their users are located. CVC mixers commonly obscure their locations, including (1) employing The Onion Router (TOR) to conceal the location of their servers; (2) failing to register as a business in any jurisdiction; and (3) failing to maintain any activity logs. Based on public and non-public information, FinCEN assesses that CVC mixing activity often occurs within or involves numerous jurisdictions outside the United States and, indeed, throughout the world. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and open source reporting identified an increase in the use of CVC in terror finance, including by Hamas and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and the use of CVC mixers to obfuscate source of funds to protect the identity of their donors. In addition, FinCEN has identified the use of CVC mixing services as a prevalent money laundering typology for the top 10 ransomware strains identified in BSA data from January 2021 to June 2021, and, notably, open source analysis of CVC payments indicates that up to 74 percent of ransomware activity is associated with Russia.

可兑换虚拟货币混币器以不透明的操作结构开展业务，并采取措施避免自己及用户的位置被发现。可兑换虚拟货币混币器通常会通过以下手段来掩盖自己的位置：⑴使用洋葱路由（TOR）来隐瞒服务器的位置；⑵未在任何司法管辖区办理企业注册；以及⑶未保存任何活动日志。基于公开和非公开信息，FinCEN评估认为，可兑换虚拟货币混币活动往往发生在美国境内或者涉及美国境外的许多司法管辖区，甚至是全世界。司法部和开源报告均发现，可兑换虚拟货币被越来越多地用于包括哈马斯和伊斯兰国（ISIS）在内的恐怖融资，可兑换虚拟货币混币器也越来越多地被用于混淆资金来源以保护捐助者的身份。此外，FinCEN已认定使用可兑换虚拟货币混币服务是2021年1-6月《银行保密法》数据中确定的前十大勒索软件变种的一种普遍存在的洗钱类型学，并且值得注意的是，对可兑换虚拟货币支付的开源分析表明，高达74%的勒索软件活动与俄罗斯有关。The global nature of the problem is further demonstrated by the fact that no CVC mixers are currently registered with FinCEN. CVC mixers are required to register with FinCEN if they do business as money transmitters wholly or in substantial part within the United States. To the extent foreign CVC mixers are operating beyond United States jurisdiction, they are not subject to U.S. regulations that require financial institutions to, among other things, know the identity of their customers and report suspicious activity to FinCEN. Nevertheless, FinCEN assesses that other forms of CVC mixing, that do not involve the use of CVC mixers, do occur within the United States.

目前没有可兑换虚拟货币混币器在FinCEN注册，这一事实进一步证明了这一问题的全球性。如果可兑换虚拟货币混币器全部或大部分在美国境内作为货币传输机构开展业务，则必须在FinCEN注册。如果外国可兑换虚拟货币混币器在美国司法管辖范围之外运营，则不受美国法规的约束，后者要求金融机构了解客户的身份并向FinCEN报告可疑活动。尽管如此，FinCEN评估认为，美国境内确实存在不涉及使用可兑换虚拟货币混币器的其他形式可兑换虚拟货币混币行为。Recent U.S. and foreign enforcement actions also reflect CVC mixing transactions within or involving numerous foreign jurisdictions, including DPRK, Russia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Vietnam. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) actions in 2022, for instance, highlighted the links between the DPRK and CVC mixers Blender.io and Tornado Cash – through their respective involvement in the Axie Infinity heist in March 2022 and Tornado Cash’s involvement in the Harmony Horizon Bridge (Harmony) heist in June 2022. The coordinated international takedown of ChipMixer, a darknet CVC “mixing” service operated by Vietnamese national Minh Quôc Nguyên in Hanoi, Vietnam, by the DOJ and the German Federal Criminal Police (Bundeskriminalamt or BKA) on March 15, 2023, and shutdown of Bestmixer.io and associated seizure of servers located in the Netherlands and Luxembourg by the Dutch Fiscal Information and Investigation Service (FIOD), in close cooperation with Europol and Luxembourg authorities on May 22, 2019, similarly demonstrate the international character of CVC mixing transactions – spanning jurisdictions across Europe and Asia.

近来美国和外国的执法行动也反映了发生在包括朝鲜、俄罗斯、卢森堡、荷兰和越南在内的许多外国司法管辖区境内或者涉及这些司法管辖区的可兑换虚拟货币混币交易。例如，OFAC在2022年的行动突显了朝鲜与可兑换虚拟货币混币器Blender.io和Tornado Cash之间的联系——两者分别参与了2022年3月的Axie Infinity抢劫案，后者还参与了2022年6月的Harmony地平线桥抢劫案（注：见https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1702）。2023年3月15日，司法部与德国联邦刑事警察局（BKA）协调捣毁了由越南公民Minh Quôc Nguyên在越南河内运营的暗网可兑换虚拟货币“混币”服务ChipMixer；2019年5月22日，荷兰财政信息与调查服务局（FIOD）在欧洲刑警组织和卢森堡主管部门的密切配合下关闭了Bestmixer.io并查获了位于荷兰和卢森堡的服务器；这些案件同样表明了可兑换虚拟货币混币交易的国际性——横跨欧洲和亚洲的司法管辖区。2. CVC Mixing Is Used To Launder Proceeds of Large-Scale CVC Theft and Heists

2．可兑换虚拟货币混币行为被用来清洗大规模可兑换虚拟货币盗窃和抢劫的收益FinCEN assesses that CVC mixing is used to launder the proceeds of large-scale CVC theft and heists by both state and non-state sponsored actors. Whether heists are carried out by state or non-state actors, the need for CVC mixing is the same – illicit CVC must be laundered, and CVC mixing provides the enhanced anonymity to separate illicitly obtained CVC from the underlying illicit activity.

FinCEN评估认为，可兑换虚拟货币混币行为被国家和非国家支持的行为者用来清洗大规模可兑换虚拟货币盗窃和抢劫的收益。无论抢劫是由国家行为者还是由非国家行为者实施的，对可兑换虚拟货币混币行为的需求都是一样的——非法可兑换虚拟货币必须被清洗，而可兑换虚拟货币混币行为提供了增强的匿名性，使其能够将非法获得的可兑换虚拟货币与基础非法活动区分开来。Non-state-affiliated actors commonly use CVC mixing services to launder their proceeds from large scale heists. The proceeds from the heists that targeted a CVC exchanger and cross-chain bridge Nomad were, for instances, laundered using the Tornado Cash CVC mixer.

非国家附属的行为者通常将可兑换虚拟货币混币服务用于清洗大规模抢劫的收益。例如，Tornado Cash可兑换虚拟货币混币器被用来清洗针对可兑换虚拟货币兑换商和跨链桥Nomad的抢劫收益。In addition to the use of CVC mixing by non-state-affiliated actors, FinCEN assesses that, based on public and non-public reporting, DPRK state-sponsored or -affiliated cyber threat actors are responsible for a substantial portion of illicit or stolen CVC funds sent to CVC mixers, and that the DPRK utilized CVC mixing to launder proceeds in an attempt to obfuscate its connection to those funds. The DPRK uses the mixed proceeds of these thefts to support its WMD program. A publicly available analysis in February 2021 determined that individuals acting for or on behalf of the North Korean government laundered more than 65 percent of stolen CVC through CVC mixers – an increase from 42 percent in 2020 and 21 percent in 2019. Further, publicly available analysis in February 2022 assessed that the DPRK is a systematic money launderer and that its use of multiple CVC mixers is a calculated attempt to obscure the origins of its ill-gotten CVCs while converting them into fiat currency. In the same year, there was a notable increase in large scale heists carried out by, or in support of, the DPRK, with associated use of CVC mixing and CVC mixers. OFAC sanctioned two CVC mixers, Blender.io and Tornado Cash, used to launder illicit proceeds of the March 2022 Axie Infinity heist and the June 2022 Harmony heist, both of which were carried out by North Korea’s Lazarus Group. In addition, DOJ has determined that ChipMixer processed over $700 million in Bitcoin associated with wallet addresses identified as containing stolen CVC, including CVC related to the Axie Infinity and the Harmony heists. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has also determined that North Korean cyber actors laundered over $60 million worth of Ethereum stolen during the Harmony heist through RAILGUN, a United Kingdom-based CVC mixer. Importantly, DPRK-sponsored and -affiliated actors’ desire to rely on CVC mixing appears unlikely to abate. Most recently, in August 2023 the FBI attributed the June 2023 Atomic Wallet heist to the Lazarus Group, and open-source reporting indicates that the Lazarus Group used specific services including Sinbad, a CVC mixer, to launder the stolen CVC.

除了非国家附属的行为者使用可兑换虚拟货币混币行为外，FinCEN评估认为，基于公开和非公开报告，朝鲜支持或附属的网络威胁行为者应当对发送给可兑换虚拟货币混币器的大部分非法或盗取的可兑换虚拟货币资金负责，并且朝鲜利用可兑换虚拟货币混币行为清洗收益，试图混淆其与这些资金的联系。朝鲜利用这些混合后的盗窃收益来支持大规模杀伤性武器计划。2021年2月的一项公开分析确定，为朝鲜政府或者代表朝鲜政府行事的个人通过可兑换虚拟货币混币器清洗了超过65%的被盗可兑换虚拟货币——超过了2020年的42%和2019年的21%。此外，2022年2月的公开分析评估认为，朝鲜是一个系统性的洗钱国家，其使用多个可兑换虚拟货币混币器是在有意掩盖非法获得的可兑换虚拟货币的来源，同时将其兑换成法定货币。同年，朝鲜实施或支持实施的、并且使用了可兑换虚拟货币混币行为和可兑换虚拟货币混币器的大规模抢劫案显著增加。OFAC制裁了两个可兑换虚拟货币混币器Blender.io和Tornado Cash，两者被用来清洗2022年3月Axie Infinity抢劫案和2022年6月Harmony抢劫案的非法收益，两起抢劫案均是由朝鲜的拉撒路集团实施的。此外，司法部已查明ChipMixer处理了超过7亿美元的比特币，这些比特币的钱包地址被发现包含被盗的可兑换虚拟货币，包括与Axie Infinity和Harmony抢劫案相关的可兑换虚拟货币。联邦调查局（FBI）也查明朝鲜网络行为者通过总部位于英国的可兑换虚拟货币混币器RAILGUN清洗了Harmony抢劫案中被盗的价值超过6000万美元的以太坊。重要的是，朝鲜支持和附属的行为者依赖可兑换虚拟货币混币行为的愿望似乎不太可能减弱。最近，在2023年8月，联邦调查局将2023年6月的Atomic Wallet抢劫案归因于拉撒路集团，开源报告则表明，拉撒路集团将包括可兑换虚拟货币混币器Sinbad在内的特定服务用于清洗被盗的可兑换虚拟货币。In brief, non-state actors and, significantly, DPRK state-sponsored or -affiliated cyber threat actors have repeatedly used, and continue to use, CVC mixing to launder illicit proceeds from large-scale CVC theft and heists.

总之，非国家行为者，特别是朝鲜支持或附属的网络威胁行为者，已经多次并将继续使用可兑换虚拟货币混币行为来清洗大规模可兑换虚拟货币盗窃和抢劫的非法收益。3. CVC Mixing Is Used by Ransomware and Darknet Markets

3．可兑换虚拟货币混币行为被勒索软件和暗网市场所利用CVC mixing services that obfuscate blockchain trails are attractive for cybercriminals looking to launder illegal proceeds from malicious cyber-enabled activities, including ransomware attacks. FinCEN assesses that threat actors avoiding reusing wallets, using CVC mixing services, and “chain hopping” have been prevalent associated money laundering typologies. Open-source analysis in July 2022 reported that nearly 10 percent of all CVC sent from addresses tied to illicit activity were sent to CVC mixers, while no other service type exceeded a 0.3 percent CVC mixer sending share. FinCEN’s analysis of the top 10 CVC mixers by volume per commercially available data determined that approximately 33 percent of all deposits as of August 2022 were attributed to high risk sources, with 13 percent of all deposits coming from known illicit activities. More significantly, only a portion of the activity in the CVC ecosystem with exposure to CVC mixing is captured by BSA reporting. As a result, FinCEN assesses that high-risk deposits into CVC mixers are likely underreported, and the percent of CVC tied to illicit activity is likely higher.

混淆区块链踪迹的可兑换虚拟货币混币服务受到了那些希望清洗包括勒索软件攻击在内的恶意网络活动非法收益的网络犯罪分子的青睐。FinCEN评估认为，威胁行为者避免钱包的重复使用、使用可兑换虚拟货币混币服务和“跳链”是普遍存在的相关洗钱类型学（注：见https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-issues-report-ransomware-trends-bank-secrecy-act-data）。2022年7月的开源分析报告称，从与非法活动有关的地址发送的所有可兑换虚拟货币中，有近10%被发送给可兑换虚拟货币混币器，而其他服务类型发送给可兑换虚拟货币混币器的份额都未超过0.3%。FinCEN对按照商业可用数据计算的前十大可兑换虚拟货币混币器的分析确定，截至2022年8月，所有存入中约有33%归因于高风险来源，其中13%来自已知的非法活动。更重要的是，《银行保密法》报告仅捕获到可兑换虚拟货币生态系统中暴露于可兑换虚拟货币混币行为的一部分活动。因此，FinCEN评估认为，可兑换虚拟货币混币器中的高风险存入可能被漏报，与非法活动有关的可兑换虚拟货币占比可能更高。The relationship between CVC mixing and malicious cyber-enabled and other criminal activities is evident through the reliance of ransomware actors on CVC mixing. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identified this connection, noting in 2022 the ongoing and growing threat of criminal misuse of CVC for the receipt and laundering of illicit proceeds from ransomware attacks, expressing particular concern that ransomware cybercriminals are increasingly using CVC mixers to launder their illicit proceeds. Similarly, between January and June 2021, FinCEN observed the use of CVC mixing services (as reflected in BSA reporting of suspicious activity) with the top 10 ransomware strains identified as sending approximately $35.2 million to CVC mixers. During this same time period FinCEN also observed “chain hopping” by ransomware actors to obfuscate the origin of their proceeds as well as that ransomware actors layered funds through multiple wallet addresses and avoided reusing wallet addresses for each attack. The most prevalent ransomware variants observed by FinCEN between January and June 2021 were Russia-affiliated REvil/Sodinokibi, and Conti, and Russian-speaking DarkSide, Avaddon, and Phobos.

通过勒索软件行为者对可兑换虚拟货币混币行为的依赖，可以明显看出可兑换虚拟货币混币行为与恶意网络犯罪活动和其他犯罪活动之间的关系。金融行动特别工作组（FATF）发现了这一联系，于2022年指出，犯罪分子滥用可兑换虚拟货币接收和清洗勒索软件攻击非法收益的威胁持续存在且日益严重，并对勒索软件网络犯罪分子越来越多地将可兑换虚拟货币混币器用于清洗非法收益表示特别关切（注：见https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Targeted-update-virtual-assets-vasps.html）。类似地，2021年1-6月期间，FinCEN观察到使用可兑换虚拟货币混币服务（反映在《银行保密法》报告的可疑活动中）的前十大勒索软件变种被发现向可兑换虚拟货币混币器发送了约3520万美元。在同一时期，FinCEN还观察到勒索软件行为者通过“跳链”来混淆收益的来源，以及勒索软件行为者通过多个钱包地址来离析资金，并避免每次攻击中钱包地址的重复使用。FinCEN在2021年1-6月期间观察到的最普遍的勒索软件变种是俄罗斯附属的REvil/Sodinokibi和Conti，以及讲俄语的DarkSide、Avaddon和Phobos（注：见https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-issues-report-ransomware-trends-bank-secrecy-act-data）。The relationship between CVC mixing and illicit activities is likewise prevalent in transactions involving darknet markets. CVC mixing services often deliberately operate opaquely and advertise their services as a way to pay anonymously for illicit items such as illegal narcotics, firearms, and child sexual abuse material. According to DOJ, the mixer Bitcoin Fog – the longest running Bitcoin money laundering service on the darknet – laundered CVC from darknet marketplaces tied to illegal narcotics, computer fraud and abuse activities, and identity theft. Additionally, according to the Government Accountability Office and DOJ, the dismantled darknet market Alphabay allegedly not only sold and purchased various illegal drugs, illicit goods, and services with CVC, but also allegedly provided mixing services, via the CVC mixer Helix, to obfuscate CVC transactions on the site.

可兑换虚拟货币混币行为与非法活动之间的关系在涉及暗网市场的交易中同样普遍存在。可兑换虚拟货币混币服务往往故意不透明地运作，并将其服务宣传为可以匿名支付非法物品，如非法麻醉药品、枪支和儿童性虐待材料（注：见https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/first-bitcoin-mixer-penalized-fincen-violating-anti-money-laundering-laws）。据司法部称，混币器比特币雾是暗网上运行时间最长的比特币洗钱服务，它清洗的可兑换虚拟货币来自与非法麻醉药品、计算机欺诈和滥用活动以及身份盗窃有关的暗网市场。此外，据政府问责办公室（GAO）和司法部称，被捣毁的暗网市场Alphabay不仅涉嫌通过可兑换虚拟货币出售和购买各种非法毒品、非法商品和服务，而且涉嫌通过可兑换虚拟货币混币器Helix提供混币服务，以混淆网站上的可兑换虚拟货币交易。As these examples demonstrate, illicit actors of all types conducting illicit cyber activity, including ransomware attacks and transactions on darknet markets, frequently seek out services that mask their illicit transactions and favor the enhanced anonymity provided by CVC mixing. Furthermore, FinCEN assesses that the percentage of mixing activity attributed to illicit activity is increasing. According to publicly available analysis reported in January 2023, the total amount of CVC sent to CVC mixers fell significantly, likely due to OFAC designation of two CVC mixers, Blender.io and Tornado Cash. However, the analysis noted the CVC that was sent to CVC mixers in 2022 was more likely to come from illicit sources than in previous years – 24 percent of the $7.8 billion processed by mixers in 2022 versus 10 percent of the $11.5 billion processed by mixers in 2021. This shift constitutes a 62.78 percent increase in the illicit value flowing through CVC mixers, year over year.

正如这些例子所表明的那样，各种类型的不法分子从事非法网络活动，包括勒索软件攻击和暗网市场交易在内，经常寻求能够掩盖非法交易的服务，并且偏爱可兑换虚拟货币混币行为提供的增强的匿名性。此外，FinCEN评估认为，非法活动导致的混币活动占比正在增加。根据2023年1月报道的公开分析，发送给可兑换虚拟货币混币器的可兑换虚拟货币总量大幅下降，这可能是因为OFAC列名了两个可兑换虚拟货币混币器Blender.io和Tornado Cash。然而，分析指出，2022年发送给可兑换虚拟货币混币器的可兑换虚拟货币比往年更有可能来自非法来源——2022年由混币器处理的78亿美元中有24%来自非法来源，而2021年由混币器处理的115亿美元中只有10%。这一转变使流经可兑换虚拟货币混币器的非法价值同比增长62.78%。B. The extent to which the class of transactions is used for legitimate business purposes

（二）此类交易被用于合法商业目的的程度FinCEN recognizes that there are legitimate reasons why responsible actors might want to conduct financial transactions in a secure and private manner given the amount of information available on public blockchains. FinCEN also recognizes that, in addition to illicit purposes, CVC mixing may be used for legitimate purposes, such as privacy enhancement for those who live under repressive regimes or wish to conduct licit transactions anonymously. Still, CVC mixing presents an acute money laundering risk because it shields information from responsible third parties, such as financial institutions and law enforcement.

FinCEN认识到，鉴于公共区块链上可用的信息量，负责任的行为者可能希望以安全和私密的方式进行金融交易，这是有正当理由的。FinCEN还认识到，除了非法目的外，可兑换虚拟货币混币行为也可用于合法目的，比如为那些生活在专制政权下或者希望匿名进行合法交易的人增强隐私。尽管如此，可兑换虚拟货币混币行为存在严重的洗钱风险，原因是它向金融机构和执法部门等负责任的第三方屏蔽了信息。FinCEN is concerned that CVC mixing makes CVC flows untraceable by law enforcement and makes potentially suspicious transactions unreportable by responsible financial institutions – thereby fostering illicit activity as described elsewhere in this document. More importantly, FinCEN assesses that the percentage of CVC mixing activity attributed to illicit activity is increasing. At the same time, because of the lack of available transactional information, FinCEN cannot fully assess the extent to which, or quantity thereof, CVC mixing activity is attributed to legitimate business purposes.

FinCEN担心，可兑换虚拟货币混币行为会使执法部门无法追踪可兑换虚拟货币的流动，并使负责任的金融机构无法报告潜在的可疑交易——从而助长了本文件其他部分所述的非法活动。更重要的是，FinCEN评估认为，非法活动导致的可兑换虚拟货币混币活动占比正在增加。与此同时，由于缺乏可用的交易信息，FinCEN无法充分评估可兑换虚拟货币混币活动归因于合法商业目的的程度或数量。Thus, the legitimate applications of CVC mixing must be carefully weighed against the exposure of the U.S. financial system to ongoing illicit use of CVC mixing. Given the substantial risks posed by CVC mixing, the fact that CVC mixing can be used for some legitimate business purposes does not alter FinCEN’s conclusion that this class of transactions is of primary money laundering concern.

因此，必须仔细权衡可兑换虚拟货币混币行为的合法应用与美国金融体系面临持续非法使用可兑换虚拟货币混币行为的风险。鉴于可兑换虚拟货币混币行为带来的巨大风险，可兑换虚拟货币混币行为可用于某些合法商业目的的事实并不会改变FinCEN的结论，即此类交易存在重大洗钱问题。C. The extent to which action by FinCEN would guard against international money laundering and other financial crimes

（三）FinCEN的行动可以防范国际洗钱和其他金融犯罪的程度Given the threats posed to U.S. national security and the U.S. financial system by obfuscation of illicit proceed flows through CVC mixing, FinCEN believes that imposing recordkeeping and reporting requirements under special measure one would guard against international money laundering and other financial crimes by increasing transparency in these transactions, and thus render them less attractive to illicit actors while also providing additional information to support law enforcement investigations.

鉴于通过可兑换虚拟货币混币行为混淆非法资金流动对美国国家安全和美国金融体系构成的威胁，FinCEN认为实施特别措施1项下记录保存和报告要求将通过提高这些交易的透明度来防范国际洗钱和其他金融犯罪，从而降低它们对不法分子的吸引力，同时也提供了额外的信息来支持执法调查。This additional transparancy would serve two purposes. First, it would enable investigations by law enforcement and regulators to support money laundering investigations, including cases against North Korean and Russian cybercriminals that pose a threat to U.S national security and the U.S. financial system. Second, it would highlight the risks and deter illicit actors’ use of CVC mixing services, including by foreign state-sponsored or -affiliated cyber actors’ laundering proceeds of CVC theft to facilitate WMD proliferation, ransomware attackers’ laundering of ransoms, and obfuscation of transactions associated with the use of illicit darknet markets.

这种额外的透明度将达到两个目的。首先，它将使执法部门和监管机构的调查能够支持洗钱调查，包括针对对美国国家安全和美国金融体系构成威胁的朝鲜和俄罗斯网络犯罪分子的案件。其次，它将突出风险并遏制不法分子使用可兑换虚拟货币混币服务，包括外国支持或附属的网络行为者清洗可兑换虚拟货币盗窃收益以促进大规模杀伤性武器扩散、勒索软件攻击者清洗赎金、以及混淆与使用非法暗网市场相关的交易。